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Abstract: Methods used to infer causal relations from data rather than 
knowledge of mechanisms are most helpful and exploited only if the 
theoretical background is insufficient or experimentation impossible. 
The review of literature shows that when an investigator has no prior 
knowledge of the researched phenomenon, no result of the Granger-
causality test has any epistemic utility due to different possible 
interpretations. (1) Rejecting the null in one of the tests can be 
interpreted as either a true causal relation, opposite direction of the true 
causation, instant causality, time series cointegration, not frequent 
enough sampling, etc. (2) Bi-directional Granger causality can be read 
either as instant causality or common cause fallacy. (3) Non-rejection of 
both nulls possibly means either indirect or nonlinear causality, or no 
causal relation. 
 





The aim of this paper is to prove the illegitimacy of usual interpretations of Granger-
causality test results.  
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What exactly is Granger-causality? The simplest definition was provided by the author 
(Granger, 1980: p. 334): ‘A (time series) variable A causes B, if the probability of B 
conditional on its own past history and the past history of A (beside the set of the 
available information) does not equal the probability of B conditional on its own past 
history alone.’ 
Previously, the question what legitimate conclusions can be drawn from an application 
of Granger-causality when the scholar has no prior theoretical knowledge has never 
been considered. On the one hand, the existence of Granger-causality is usually tested 
when the theory on (eventually causal) mechanisms connecting the two time series is 
insufficient or does not exist. On the other hand, a review of the literature conducted 
below shows some serious pitfalls of the method. It is shown in the paper that in case of 
limited knowledge on the investigated phenomenon, one cannot judge whether the 
relation discovered by Granger-causality test is true or erroneous due to e. g. 
inappropriate sampling frequency, the existence of rational expectations, nonlinear 
causal relationship, time series cointegration etc. (cf. Conclusions). 
Therefore, I attempt to answer the question what conclusions (if any) are justified in 
the case of each Granger-causality test results of the possible four. Although there are 
studies on some aspects of the method’s fallaciousness, the findings are a novelty given 
the assumption that the researcher using Granger-causality tests does know neither a 
theory nor any additional statistics on the studied phenomenon.  
First, the importance of a better understanding of the Granger-causality pitfalls is 
explained by its popularity and respectability. Second, Granger-causality definition 
and its philosophical sources are reviewed. The main part of the paper consists of an 
analysis of this phenomenon. The discussion is summed up in Conclusions, where I 
attempt to determine what conclusion(s) on causal relations between two investigated 
variables are justified given a certain test result. 
 
 
Popularity of the Method 
 
Studying Granger-causality testing continues to be expedient due to the growing 
popularity of both the fields of science where theoretical background is insufficient 
and the quantitative methods as such. Hoover (2006) states that Granger-causality is 
the most influential approach to causality in economics. Granger’s (1969) method of 
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inferring causal relationship between stochastic variables without any prior theoretical 
knowledge met with strong criticism, focused mostly on the difference between 
Granger-causality and the common sense understanding of the cause-effect 
relationship (Liu, Bahadori 2012). In addition, some researchers highlight several 
problematic aspects of methodology and empirical misapplications (e.g. Russo 2008). 
The growing popularity of a statistical method employed to infer causal relations from 
data (i. e. Granger-causality) makes it impossible to agree with LeRoy’s statement that 
‘it is true that the topic of causality has been of passing interest to economists’ (Le Roy 
2004, p. 2). 
Despite criticism, Granger-causality tests have been applied to over 45 thousand studies 
indexed by the world’s most popular scholar papers search engine. (Jascó 2005). The 
growing popularity of Granger’s method is shown in Graph 1. Granger-causality is now 
being applied not only to econometrics, but for example to neuroscience, epidemiology, 
financial analysis etc. The growing trend is more and more rapid, which is especially 
visible after the year 2002 when the number of one thousand papers per year was 
exceeded for the first time.  
 
Figure 1: The number of papers with ‘Granger-causality’ as one of the keywords. 
Source: Own calculations based on data delivered by Google Scholar. 
The growing popularity of statistical studies and fields of research benefiting from the 
use of Granger-causality (i.e. where experimentation is not possible) is supposed to 
explain why this method has been becoming more and more popular. On the other 
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Granger’s ideas on causality 
 
Although philosophers have been interested in causality since the beginning of 
philosophy itself (Beebee et al. 2009, p. 21), its definitions are still not widely accepted 
(Granger 1980). Present plurality of viewpoints was summed up well by Nancy 
Cartwright (2006) - not the actress who was Bart Simpson’s voice but a philosopher of 
science – Each author of any definition argues that his definition is informative. 
Then, it is all too clear that at the outset of the dispute the goal of economics should be 
highlighted. Ever since it came to be as a field of scientific research, understanding the 
economic phenomena as a cause-effect process has been its objective, which can be 
demonstrated by the title of Smith’s book (1776) that is directly connected to causal 
inquiries. Other classical economists dealing with the philosophy of causation are 
Ricardo and Mill (Chu et al. 2004). 
 
Despite the existent tradition among economists, Granger’s source of inspiration to 
create a method of statistical testing whether causal dependency between two time 
series exists or not, was Hume (1739), who maintained that the human mind was 
incapable of recognizing causal relationships (cf. Hoover 2001). Hume argued in 
favour of reductionism: an observer can perceive only one event. It implies that the 
relationship between the cause and the effect, which connects two moments of temporal 
continuum, is impossible to be recognized. Consequently, Hume’s point of view is that a 
phenomenon can be called ‘causal’ if it meets the following requirements: (Granger 
2012) 
(1) Cause precedes effect in time. 
(2) Cause includes information about the effect that is not available in a wide 
group of other variables. 
The first quantifiable definition of causation was formulated by Wiener (1956, p. 127) 
who too took into account the following axiom, ‘For two simultaneously measured 
signals, if we can predict the first signal better by using the past information from the 
second one than by using the information without it, then we call the second signal 
causal to the first one.’ 
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Granger’s definition of causation is based on three assumptions: (Granger 1980) 
(1) The past and the present may cause the future, but the future cannot cause the 
past. 
(2) Ώn(all the knowledge available in the Universe on t)contains no redundant 
information, so that if some variable Zn is functionally related to one or more 
other variables, in a deterministic fashion, then Zn should be excluded from 
Ώn. 
(3) All causal relationships remain constant in direction throughout time. 
In the Award Ceremony Speech delivered on the occasion of being granted The Sveriges 
Riskbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, Granger admitted 
that the first two axioms were inspired by Hume’s ideas on causation (Dufour and 
Taamouti 2010). Axiom number three was added in order to make a distinction 
between a random correlation and causation, which is known to be the most popular 
‘sin’ of statisticians (Stern 2011). Granger (1980) justifies this assumption by an 
example of a model containing three time series (number of patients accepted into 
hospital on day t; number of patients leaving hospital on day t; number of ice-cream 
portions sold in the considered city on day t) and claims that the only constant over 
time dependencies can be suspected to be causal. Although the temporal correlation 
between the number of patients leaving the hospital and the number of ice-cream 
portions sold may be observed, these two variables are not structurally related and their 
relationship is probably insignificant if sufficiently long time series are taken into 
account. 
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Yn causes Xn+1iff: 
𝑃(𝑋𝑛+1 ∈ 𝐴|Ώ𝑛) ≠ 𝑃(𝑋𝑛+1 ∈ 𝐴|Ώ𝑛 − 𝑌𝑛) for some A 
𝑋𝑡; 𝑌𝑡- variables suspected to be causally connected 
Ώ𝑡 - all the knowledge available in the Universe on t 
A direct application of the above definition is impossible due to the degree-of-freedom 
problem implied by the finiteness of real-world time series and the requirement of 
considering all available knowledge. Taking into account the applicability of the 
definition to empirical research, it is essential to have an operational definition of 
causality. The aim of such a definition is to allow inference about cause-effect 
relationships from observational studies. In order to make his definition applicable, 
Granger (1969) redefined Ώ𝑛 to be understood as a dataset which contains all useful 
information. In accordance with the above definition, variable Y causes variable X if 
Y contains additional, original information that is helpful in predicting the second 
variable.  
One year after Granger’s paper on inferring causal relations from statistical data, 
Suppes (1970, p. 15) develops a Probabilistic Theory of Causation. One of its 
improvements consisted in prima facie causality: ‘An event A causes prima facie an 
event B if the conditional probability of B given A is greater than B alone, and A 
occurs before B.’ 
𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) > 𝑃(𝐵) 
Inspired by this idea, Granger (1980) uses prima facie causality for a time series 
analysis which allowed him to build a quantifiable definition. Variable Y prima facie 
causes variable X, if: 
𝑃(𝑋𝑛+1 ∈ 𝐴|𝑋, 𝑌) ≠ 𝑃(𝑋𝑛+1 ∈ 𝐴|𝑋) for some A 
X; Y – history of time series: X; Y 
𝑋𝑛+1 – the value of X on t+1 
Some critics of Granger-causality focus on pointing out the differences between the  
common-sense understanding of causality and the method in question. Granger (1980) 
defends his idea with the following argument: Common words, such as ‘apple’ and ‘fear’, 
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are used and understood in the same way by most people. Similarly, when you start a 
lecture, you can define what is meant by ‘variance’ or ‘cos x’ in order to be understood. 
Moreover, Granger argues, by defining ‘x3’ in a way that is usually designated by ‘cos x’ 
you will not gain popularity among students, but this is not a logical mistake. 
Accepting  these arguments implies that considering whether Granger-causality tests 
are informative and valuable for economics and science is much more important than 
comparing Granger’s idea with what ‘causation’ means. 
 
 
Granger-causality test application and fallacy 
 
In spite of the ever-growing popularity in empirical research, the findings of Granger-
causality tests may lead to erroneous results. In hitherto available literature on 
statistical tests of causality scarcely any attention is devoted to informativity of 
Granger-causality tests in cases where the investigator has no additional knowledge 
about the researched phenomenon. Therefore, analysing every area of fallacy of the 
method seems important to understand whether a scholar applying the Granger 





Many statistical tests are developed to find Granger-causality dependencies. The most 
popular include Granger direct test (Granger 1969) and Sims test (Sims 1972). Causal 
relationship is detected when some equation parameters are statistically significant. 
Geweke (et al. 1984) proves deductively that the power of eight different tests they 
considered is different, i.e. they reject the null-hypothesis  with different frequencies. 
The same results were obtained by the Monte Carlo method by Nelson et al. (1982) and 
Geweke et al. (1984). Conway et al. (1984, p. 2) summed up these results with the 
following statement: ‘one could easily produce conflicting conclusions by employing a 
battery of causality tests on the same data sets’. 
 
Therefore, it is possible to apply two Granger-causality tests to the same data set and 
obtain different outcomes: one confirming the null and the other rejecting it. These 
findings are not intuitive and, in addition, contradict axiom three of Granger’s 
definition, which states that causality is constant in time. 
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In addition, the researcher must arbitrarily choose a number of lags taken into 
consideration to estimate regression coefficients. Ashrafulla et al. (2012) point out 
background knowledge as useful in making this choice. Another solution consists in 
using autocorrelation functions (ACF) or Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Liu 
and Bahadori 2012).  
 
Arbitrariness of this decision may lead investigators using the same Granger-causality 
test to different conclusions. Such a difference in findings was observed by Slaugh 
(1981) who compared papers on money-income causality. (Conway et al. 1984) 
 
In addition, the result confirming the null may be obtained even though there is a 
causal, nonlinear relation. The most popular tests (e. g. General Granger-causality 
Test, Sims Test and Modified Sims Test), were developed to test the existence of (only) 
linear dependencies. Therefore, some asymmetry in tests’ behaviour can be observed. 
The null rejection means there is a (linear) Granger-causality. On the other hand, non-
rejection of the null is interpreted as evidence for lack of causality, even though a 
nonlinear relation may occur. 
 
 
The effects of time series transformation 
 
Least Squares Method, used to estimate the parameters of equation in most of Granger-
causality tests, requires some conditions to be met to get reliable results. If nonlinearity 
occurs, data must be linearized. Logarithm transformation is one of the standard 
econometric methods of data pre-processing in this case. In spite of its widespread use, 
Roberts and Nord (1985), analysing data on nominal income, earnings and money 
supply, observed that the functional form of the model influences the findings of 
Granger-causality tests. On the one hand, causal relation is observed between raw time 
series. On the other hand, logarithmized data does not reject the null hypothesis. 
Despite these findings, Brassler and Seth (2010) admitted that linearization is a good 
approximation for Granger-causality testing in neuroscience. 
Non-stationary data poses another problem in applying econometric methods to 
empirical time series. If a variable is driven by a stochastic trend, its value averages for 
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different periods differ significantly. In this case, calculating the first difference is 
recommended: 
𝑋′𝑡 = 𝑋𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡−1 
The above procedure improves the quality of a model but at the same time influences 
Granger causality tests’ findings. The two models of causality between GDP and power 
consumption in South Korea (one based on cointegrated data and error-correction 
models) show contradictory results (Glasure and Lee 1998). A strong, bidirectional 
causal relation is detected in the second case. The first model shows no significant 
relation. In addition, the findings of Glasure and Lee differ from the conclusions of 
Yu and Choi (1985). A possible explanation is the use of differentiated data, but the 
researchers indicated a different period of the study (Glasure and Lee 1998).  
Lee (et al. 2002) supposed that Granger-causality tests are not objective in the case of 
cointegrated time series and pointed out that the findings can be biased, so that they 
more often reject the null. Further discussion and conclusions of different Granger-
causality tests can be found in Hacker and Abdulnasser (2006). However, these facts 
are not widely known by econometricians. For example, Osińska (2008, pp. 75) advises 
to apply the Granger-causality tests to nonstationary and cointegrated time series when 
they can be transformed by adding determinist components (e. g. trend, seasonality) or 
mathematical transformation. 
ARIMA (Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average) models are another, more 
sophisticated method developed to deal with non-stationarity and seasonality. Shortly 
after Granger-causality had been defined, scientists thought nonlinear transformations 
(e. g. logarithm transformation) do not influence causality tests (Conway 1984). 
Further research contradicted this. Feige and Pearce (1976) tested dependencies 
between GDP growth, money supply and inflation. Schwert (1979) analysed data on 
innovativeness transformed by the ARIMA model in three different ways. He 
concludes that the null hypothesis is rejected too rarely by causality tests. A 
contradictory result was obtained by Lee et al. (2002). The Monte Carlo simulation 
showed that the null is rejected too often between two independent ARIMA (1,1,0) 
processes. These findings and the common-sense view that mathematical 
transformations should not influence the direction of a causal relation made Schwert 
(1979, p. 82) write, ‘[...] semantic distinction between ‘causality’ and ‘incremental 
predictability’ should be emphasized.’ 
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Sampling frequency and causality 
 
Economic time series are usually published at time intervals. Quarterly sampled 
observations modelled by VAR (vector autoregressive model) are equivalent to monthly 
VARMA, where the MA (i. e. moving average) period is 3. Taking into consideration 
previously discussed results, temporal aggregation appears to influence Granger-
causality tests. 
Causal relation was tested between money and income in three cases differently 
aggregated over time by McRorie and Chamber (2005) who concluded that economic 
processes, if sampled too rarely, would show bi-directional Granger-causality, even 
though the real, one-way causal relation exists and can be detected. The scholars 
emphasized that finding bi-directional causality is not a sufficient condition to 
conclude that the real relation is identical. 
The same conclusions were drawn by Harvey and Stock (1989) who tested Granger-
causality in a continuous time model of money-income. Granger-causality test does not 
reject the null in such a case. On the other hand, temporally aggregated (i.e. quarterly 
sampled) time series show a significant causal relation. Causality detection depends on 
the time interval used in modelling in the case of flow variables. In addition, the above 
conclusion can be true in the case of stock variables (Harvey and Stock 1989). These 
results were corroborated by Renault et al. (1998) who tested causality between the 
Swiss Franc and the Deutsche Mark in models with continuous and discrete time. 
 
 
Rational expectations and cause-effect relationship 
 
Human behaviour based on appropriate predictions can make scholars misconstrue 
Granger-causality tests. The term ‘rational expectations’ means that better predictions 
are impossible unless someone possesses better information. In other words, someone 
who makes predictions does not make a systematic mistake. For example, if companies 
were able to predict inflation (I) rationally (in the above meaning) and make 
purchases whose amount depends on future rise of prices and storage cost, then the 
expected causal relation would have the opposite direction to the flow of time: 
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𝐼𝑡+1 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟−𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠
→             𝑋𝑡 
This result would contradict axiom one of Granger’s definition (cf. 3.1. Axioms, above), 
which states that the future cannot cause the past. Is it possible that (anticipated) 
future values of one variable cause the present values of the other? The researchers’ 
opinions are divided. Noble (1982) found statistically significant causal relationship 
between the unemployment rate and aggregate nominal spending. These findings 
contradict theoretical expectations that aggregate spending is supposed to cause 
unemployment (Nelson 1981), which suggests that the rational expectations hypothesis 
is true and may enable discovery of erroneous Granger-causality relations.  
The rational expectation hypothesis was tested in order to defend the traditional view 
on causality, e. g. by Noble (1981). The findings contradicted the hypothesis, but it can 
be claimed that there are methodological weaknesses in the research. First, the survey 
data comes from the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan despite the 
fact that the question about price level expectations was changed a few times during the 
research. Second, the frequency of the survey differed, too. Third, respondents were not 
asked to state the predicted change in price level but to answer if it was more likely to 
rise/fall or stay the same. The predicted level of inflation was estimated on the grounds 
of arbitrarily assigned number values to answers, e.g.: ‘prices will be only a little 
higher’ was understood as a 2% growth of the price level. 
This methodology may lead to misleading conclusions. In addition, rational 
expectations may be supported in the same way as an efficient market hypothesis. It is 
enough for EMH to be true when only a few market participants will be right in their 
predictions, provided they have appropriate funds to influence the economy.  
If the rational expectation hypothesis is true, it will make Granger-causality tests’ 
findings contradictory to the real direction of causal relation. 
 
Common cause and indirect causality 
 
Misunderstanding causal relations between variables in the model can be a result of the 
previously discussed Granger-causality testing methods or an incorrect specification of 
the model. Granger-causality and other methods of inferring causality from data are 
exploited when the scholar does not possess theoretical knowledge about the 
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phenomenon’s mechanism. Insufficient knowledge may lead to a misspecified model, 
i.e. Granger causality tested between inappropriate time series. There are two such 
cases, common-cause fallacy and indirect causality. 
The existence of a third variable, which causes both time series among which Granger-
causality is tested, is known to be the most common reason for spurious causality (Chu 
et al. 2004). Common cause fallacy is illustrated with Figure 2: 
 
Figure 2: Common-cause fallacy. 
Source: Author 
A good example of such difficulties in the epistemology of causality is the example 
described by Woodward (2007): a scholar researching dependency between the type of 
school and exam scores, and does not consider the real determinant (i.e. parental 
income), will be likely to erroneously conclude that the choice of private education 
leads to better results. 
Glymour and Sprites (1988) pointed out that there are econometric tests used to 
discover the existence of the so-called latent variables. However, their use in Granger-
causality testing seems difficult or even impossible in the case of testing prima facie 
Granger-causality due to the lack of a typical econometric model. 
Common cause fallacy should be suspected when Granger-causality tests indicate bi-
directional Granger-causality: 
𝑋 → 𝑌 
𝑌 → 𝑋 
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Testing Granger-causality between two time series determined by a third one, generated 
with the Monte Carlo method, indicated that detecting bi-directional causality is more 
likely than one-directional causality (Sims 1977). Unfortunately, these findings are not 
known to all researchers making use of the method. In some cases, Granger causality 
test results that show a bi-directional dependency are misinterpreted. (e.g. Madrak-
Grochowska and Żurek 2011) 
Indirect causality is another situation when the researcher deals with a hidden 
variable. In contrast to the previously discussed common cause fallacy, that makes 
detecting spurious causality more likely; indirect causality may lead to type II error. 
Even though there are Granger-causality tests generalized to more than one period (e. 
g. Dufour and Taamouti 2010), the standard tests show only dependencies present 
within one period ahead, i.e. in both cases: 
𝑋𝑡 → 𝑌𝑡+2 
𝑋𝑡 → 𝑍𝑡+1 → 𝑌𝑡+2 
When causality is lagged more than one period or it is a case of indirect causality, 
standard Granger-causality tests do not reject the null, even though causal dependency 
occurs. Defenders of the method argue that the only cause-effect relationship that 
exists is between X and Z as well as Z and Y, which, in this case, is not a good point. 
Taking into account manipulationist’s account of causality and considering a thought 
experiment - value added tax rate (X) causes demand (Z) which causes GDP (Y) (cf. 





Presented arguments demonstrate that Granger causality does not meet the 
requirements of an investigator who uses this method due to epistemic reasons (i.e. in 
order to discover what variable is the cause and what is the effect) and does not possess 
prior knowledge on the phenomenon considered. Methods used to infer causal relations 
from data rather than knowledge of mechanisms are helpful and exploited only if the 
theoretical background is insufficient. Therefore, the usage of Granger-causality 
method is to be reconsidered due to its limitations. 
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The analysis of what justified information is given by specific Granger-causality test 
results, and the indication of reasons for misinterpretation when a scholar does not 
possess any additional knowledge about the mechanisms connecting two time series, are 
shown in Table 1.  
An investigator who applies the Granger-causality test can get three different results 
reject the null in one of the tests (i.e. find a one-directional causal relation), reject the 
null hypothesis of the two tests (i.e. get a bi-directional Granger-causality) or do not 
reject the null hypothesis. Taking into account the deficiencies of the method, none of 
these results justifies implications of causality that are usually drawn from the test’s 
outcome. 
In the first instance, the null is rejected in one of the tests, i e. the common 
interpretation suggests the existence of unidirectional causal relationships between two 
time series. In accordance with previous argumentation, this result can mean: 
(1) The Granger causality test is true; namely, sentence ‘X Granger-causes 
Y’ is true. 
(2) The direction of the causal relation is opposite due to rational 
expectations. Economic actors’ behaviour makes the scholar observe 
reversed dependency (Noble 1982). 
(3) If sampling is not frequent enough, one of the null rejections can mean 
there is an instant causality (McRorie and Chamber 2005). 
(4) Rejecting the null may occur due to time series non-linearity (Roberts 
and Nord 1985), time series cointegration (Lee et al. 2002), not 
frequent enough sampling (Harvey and Stock 1989) or common cause 
fallacy (Chu et al. 2004). 
In the second instance, bi-directional Granger-causality is discovered, which possibly 
means: 
(1) There is an instant Granger-causality between the time series. 
(2) X and Y are determined by a third variable (Sims 1977). 
 
The third instance, i. e. non-rejection of the null hypothesis in both tests, usually 
interpreted as a sign of no Granger-causality, can have several implications, too: 
(1) There can be nonlinear Granger-causality between time series. Another 
reason would be indirect causality (Dufour and Taamouti 2010). 
Maziarz, Mariusz (2015), A review of the Granger-causality fallacy, The Journal of 
Philosophical Economics: Reflections on Economic and Social Issues, VIII: 2, 86-105 
 
100                                                The Journal of Philosophical Economics VIII: 2 (2015) 
(2) Instant causality may be the case if the time series are non-stationary 
(Glasure and Lee 1998). 
(3) There is no causal relation between X and Y. 
 
It is true that some of the above causes of Granger-causality misinterpretation can be 
eliminated or, at least, detected (e. g.: time series cointegration, data nonlinearity). 
However, other factors are beyond the cognitive abilities of a scholar using Granger’s 
method. For example, it is impossible to judge whether constant-time causal 
dependency would be the same or contradictory unless you have access to such data, 
which is rarely possible in economic research.  
In defense of his method, Granger (1988, p. 200) wrote: ‘Possible causation is not 
considered for any arbitrarily selected group of variables, but only for variables for 
which the researcher has some prior belief that causation is, in some sense, likely.’ The 
discussion presented above confirms and expands this view. Drawing conclusions 
whether a causal relation exists between investigated time series and about its direction 
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Legend: →- causes/Granger-causes; ↔- instant causality/bidirectional Granger-




Maziarz, Mariusz (2015), A review of the Granger-causality fallacy, The Journal of 
Philosophical Economics: Reflections on Economic and Social Issues, VIII: 2, 86-105 
 
102                                                The Journal of Philosophical Economics VIII: 2 (2015) 
References 
 
Ashrafulla, Syed et al. (2012) ‘Canonical Granger causality applied to functional brain 
data’, Biomedical Imaging, 9. IEEE International Symposium on IEEE, pp. 1751-
1754. 
 
Beebee, Helen et al. (2009), The Oxford Handbook of Causation, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Bressler, Steven L. and Seth, Anil K. (2011), ‘Wiener-Granger causality: A well 
established methodology’, NeuroImage, 58 (2), 323-329. 
 
Cartwright, Nancy (2006), ‘Where Is the Theory in Our „Theories” of Causality?’,The 
Journal of Philosophy, 103 (2), 55-66. 
 
Chu, Tianjiao Danks, David and Glymour, Clark (2004), ‘Data driven methods for 
Granger causality and contemporaneous causality with non-linear corrections: Climate 
teleconnection mechanisms’, retrieved from  
http://www.hss.cmu.edu/philosophy/glymour/chudanksglymour2004.pdf 28.12.2013. 
 
Conway, Roger K. et al. (1984), ‘The impossibility of causality testing’, Agricultural 
Economics Research, 36 (3), 1-19. 
 
Cooley, Thomas and LeRoy, Stephen (1985), ‘A theoretical macroeconometrics. A 
critique’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 16, 283-308. 
 
Dufour, Jean M. and Taamouti, Abderrahim (2010), ‘Short and long run causality 
measures: Theory and inference’, Journal of Econometrics, 154 (1), 42-58. 
 
Geweke, John et al. (1983), ‘Comparing alternative tests of causality in temporal 
systems: Analytic results and experimental evidence’, Journal of Econometrics, 21, (2), 
161-194. 
 
Glasure, Yong U. and Lee, Aie R. (1998), ‘Cointegration, error-correction and the 
relationship between GDP and energy: The case of South Korea and Singapore’, 
Resource and Energy Economics, 20 (1), 17-25. 
Maziarz, Mariusz (2015), A review of the Granger-causality fallacy, The Journal of 
Philosophical Economics: Reflections on Economic and Social Issues, VIII: 2, 86-105 
 
The Journal of Philosophical Economics VIII: 2 (2015)  103 
 
Glymour, Clark and Sprites Peter (1988), ‘Latent variables, causal models and 
overidentifying constraints’, Journal of Econometrics, 39, 175-198. 
 
Granger, Clive W. J. (1969), ‘Investigating causal relations by econometric models and 
cross-spectral methods’, Econometrica, 37 (3), 424-438. 
 
Granger, Clive W. J. (1980), ‘Testing for causality.A personal viewpoint’, Journal of 
Economic Dynamic and Control, 2 (4), 329-352. 
 
Granger, Clive. W. J. (1988), ‘Some recent development in a concept of causality’, 
Journal of Econometrics, 39 (1-2), 199-211. 
 
Granger, Clive. W. J. (2012), ‘Forecasting’, in Maki, Uskali. (ed.) Philosophy of 
Economics, London: Elsevier, 311-327. 
 
Hacker, Scott R. and Abdulnasser, Hatemi (2006), ‘Tests for causality between 
integrated variables using asymptotic and bootstrap distributions: theory and 
applications’, Applied Economics, 38 (13), 1489-1500. 
 
Harvey, Andrew C. and Stock, James H. (1989), ‘Estimating integrated higher-order 
continuous time autoregressions with an application to money-income causality’, 
Journal of Econometrics, (42), 319-336. 
 
Hoover, Kevin D. (2001), Causality in Macroeconomics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Hoover, Kevin D. (2006), Causality in Economics and Econometrics. An Entry for the 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Hume, David (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature, reprinted in (1978), British 
Moralists, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, pp. 1650-1800. 
 
Jascó, Peter (2005), ‘Google Scholar: the pros and the cons’, Online Information 
Review, 29 (2), 208-214. 
 
Maziarz, Mariusz (2015), A review of the Granger-causality fallacy, The Journal of 
Philosophical Economics: Reflections on Economic and Social Issues, VIII: 2, 86-105 
 
104                                                The Journal of Philosophical Economics VIII: 2 (2015) 
Leamer, Edward E. (1985), ‘Vector autoregressions for causal inference?’,Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 22, 255-304. 
 
Lee, Hsiu Y., Lin, Kenneth S. and Wu, Jyh. L. (2002), ‘Pitfalls in using Granger 
causality tests to find an engine of growth’, Applied Economics Letters  9(6), 411-414. 
 
LeRoy, Stephen (2004), Causality in Economics, Causality: Metaphysics and Method, 
Technical Report, 20, London: Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science. 
 
Liu, Yau. and Bahadori, Mohammad T. (2012), A Survey on Granger Causality: A 
computational View, Los Angeles: University of Southern California. 
 
Madrak-Grochowska, Małgorzata and Żurek Mirosława (2011), ‘Testowanie 
przyczynowości w wariancji między wybranymi indeksami rynków akcji na świecie’, 
Oeconomia Copernica, 4, 5-27 
 
McCrorie, Roderick J. and Chambers, Marcus J. (2006), ‘Granger causality and the 
sampling of economic processes’, Journal of Econometrics, 132, 311-336. 
 
Mills, Terence C. (1990), Time Series Techniques for Economists, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Nelson, Charles R. (1981), ‘Adjustment lags versus information lags’, Credit and 
Banking, February, 1-11. 
 
Noble, Nicholas R. (1982), ‘Causality and expectational rationality: Note’, Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking. 14 (4), part 1, 532-537 
 
Osińska, Magdalena (2008), Ekonometryczna analiza zależności przyczynowych, 
Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika 
 
Renault, Eric, Sekkat, Khalid and Szafarz, Ariane (1998), ‘Testing for spurious 
causality in exchange rates’, Journal of Empirical Finance, 6 (1), 47-66. 
 
Roberts, David L. and Nord, Stephen (1985), ‘Causality tests and functional forms’, 
Applied Economics, 17 (1), 135-141. 
Maziarz, Mariusz (2015), A review of the Granger-causality fallacy, The Journal of 
Philosophical Economics: Reflections on Economic and Social Issues, VIII: 2, 86-105 
 
The Journal of Philosophical Economics VIII: 2 (2015)  105 
Russo, Frederica (2009), ‘Methodology of causal modelling’, in Russo, Frederica (ed.) 
Causality and Causal Modelling in the Social Sciences, Dordrecht: Springer, 53-90. 
 
Sargent, Thomas. (1976), ‘A classical macroeconomic model for the United States’, 
Journal of Political Economy, 84, 207-228. 
 
Schwert, William G. (1979), ‘Tests of causality: The message in the innovations’, 
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 10. Amsterdam: North-
Holland, pp. 55-96. 
 
Sims, Christopher A. (1972), ‘Money, income and causality’, The American Economic 
Review, 62 (4), pp. 540-552. 
 
Smith, Adam (1776), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 
London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell. 
 
Stern, David (2011), ‘From correlation to Granger causality’, Crawford School 
Research Paper, (13), 1-36. 
 
Suppes, Patrick (1970), ‘A probabilistic theory of causality’, Acta Philosophica 
Fennica, 24, North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 5-121. 
 
Triacca, Umberto (2007), ‘Granger causality and contiguity between stochastic 
processes’,Physics Letters A,362 (4), 252-255. 
 
Wiener, Norbert (1956), ‘The theory of prediction’, in Beckenbach, E. F. (ed.), Modern 
Mathematics for Engineers, New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 165-190. 
Woodward, James (2007), ‘Causation with a human face’, Price, H., Corry, R. (ed.), 
Causation, Physics and the Constitution of Reality: Russell’s Republic, Kingswood: 
Clarendon Press, pp. 66-105. 
 
Yu, E. S. H. and Choi, Jai (1985), ‘The causal relationship between energy and GNP: 
An international comparison’, The Journal of Energy and Development, 249-272. 
 
Mariusz Maziarz is a graduate student at the Warsaw School of Economics 
(mariusz.mm@gmail.com).
